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THE HANDMAID OF THE LORD REDUX:
CONSTRUCTING THE NEW ORTHODOX WOMANHOOD BETWEEN
CRADLE AND CONVERT
By Katherine Kelaidis

Katherine Kelaidis is the Resident Scholar at the National Hellenic Museum and a Visiting
Instructor at Loyola University Chicago. She holds a Ph.D. in Classics from the University of
London and a B.A in Classical Languages from the University of California, Berkeley. Her
current work focuses on Orthodox Christian identity and culture outside of traditionally
Orthodox countries. She is co-editor of The Wheel.
In an era when questions of sexuality and gender dominate much of the debate in
theological circles, regardless of religious or confessional affiliation, the meaning of Orthodox
Christian womanhood remains a simultaneously over-discussed and under-theorized aspect of
these conversations. This article attempts to address this discrepancy by articulating and
problematizing some of the myriad of forces that are shaping the construction of Orthodox
Christian womanhood and the identity of Orthodox Christian women today. In particular, we
explore how the “Culture Wars” (a once largely American political phenomenon) have
internationalized and become a major force in the articulation of gender both within Orthodoxy
and as a point of interface between Orthodoxy and the wider world. This development has
happened mainly through two threads: conversion by those from non-traditionally Orthodox
backgrounds in North America (and to a lesser extent Western Europe) and the reemergence of
Orthodoxy in post-communist, traditionally Orthodox lands. Both these phenomena have
interacted with one another to create a radical new image of Orthodox womanhood, one
projected as reactionary--or at least deeply conservative. In turn, this radical vision of the
Orthodox woman, the creation of a small number of ideologically motivated actors (including
high profile American Evangelicals, Russian Church leadership interested in exerting a global
force, and disaffected mainline Protestant converts to Orthodoxy who have left their former
denominations after progressive reforms), has helped to create an atmosphere that others have
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found alienating. This has set up a collision course that will have serious implications for the
Orthodox world in the years to come.
An influx of converts from non-traditionally Orthodox backgrounds into Orthodox
Christian jurisdictions in the West, particularly in the United States, began in the late 1980s.1
These converts, many fleeing the progressive reforms of their traditions of origin, frequently
brought with them a socio-politically conservative understanding of

gender and sexuality

formed in the turmoil of the American culture wars. These expectations surrounding gender were
often in sharp contrast to modernizing and assimilationist norms which had grown up in the
immigrant communities that had historically been at the center of American Orthodoxy.
Meanwhile, in the traditionally Orthodox Eastern Europe, the collapse of the Soviet Union and
attached satellite regimes led to a renewed public face for Orthodox Christianity in these
countries, a public profile that has been largely used to advance a socially-conservative political
agenda which, borrowing from the debates in the West, also focused intensely on issues of
gender and sexuality. This, in part, included reasserting imagined views of “pre-communist”
gender roles and womanhood.
Thus, both in its traditional lands and in the diaspora, Orthodox Christianity finds itself in
a uniquely intense period of gender-based debate and tension. This article will focus on how
these parallel historical developments have reshaped the normative vision of Orthodox
womanhood. We will explore how a vision of women that posits itself as reactionary is, in fact,
deeply radical and threatens to destroy the complex and multiple historical understandings of
being a woman in the Orthodox tradition.

In the Beginning
Of course, it is difficult to speak about a contemporary shift in the construction of
Orthodox womanhood without first looking to the past. We know (or at least should know) that
this past in many ways provides even less clarity than the present, because the role and position
of women in the Orthodox Christian lands and the diaspora has varied across time and space.
There is, consequently, no single “Orthodox woman” of the past to whom we can turn as our
starting point (in no small part the problem at hand, as we shall see). Here, however, because of
1

For more on this phenomenon, see Amy Slagle, The Eastern Church in the Spiritual Marketplace: American
Conversions to Orthodox Christianity. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011).

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (MARCH 2020) XL, 2

96

the importance of both to idealized contemporary notions of the past, we focus on the Byzantine
Empire and Imperial Russia.
In the patriarchal and militarized worlds of these two Orthodox Christian empires, the
records of women’s history are scarce on the ground and to the extent which they exist are
almost exclusively the work of men, largely monastic men, who introduced the lives of women
largely for rhetorical effect when making another argument. This is not to mention the ways in
which the rising tide of monastic influence in certain periods also worked to erase the presence
of women. And yet, this blotting out has always been far from complete and a picture of
Orthodox women through history can still be reconstructed.
For the most part, premodern women in the Orthodox world were bound to the same fate
of “biology as destiny” as other women. Most women married, most became mothers. This
reality, however, did not necessarily result in anything that might even vaguely suggest a
glorification of the roles of wife and mother. The complicated and frequently suspicious attitude
of early Christians toward marriage has been well documented.2 Likewise motherhood is seldom
afforded the reverential treatment that it would come to enjoy in industrial and post-industrial
societies. To be certain, elite men leave an extensive record of thanks for the influence of their
mothers; but, as Kathleen Biddick has observed, female saints and mystics are frequently
extolled for behaving in notably unmaternal ways, for example, abandoning children in order to
enter into monastic life.3
The Byzantine’s Slavic counterparts had a similarly fraught relationship with the most
frequently occupied feminine offices of the medieval world. With their conversion to Eastern
Orthodox Christianity, the Slavic peoples inherited much of the Byzantine position on marriage
and virginity. When adaptations were made, these almost always resulted in an even greater
focus on sexual restraint and the forgoing of the worldly roles of wife and mother. When these
positions were extolled, particularly in later Slavic texts, it was largely within the hagiographic
tradition of the “holy housewives.” These martyr tales are stories of women killed by abusive
husbands and thus cast as horrific exemplars of the unbreakable bounds of Christian marriage. It
is important to note, however, that alongside this seeming sanctification of marital abuse, the
2

See, for example, David G. Hunter, ed. Marriage and Sexuality in Early Christianity. (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress
Press, 2018).
3
Kathleen Biddick, “Genders, Bodies, Borders: Technologies of the Visible,” in Studying Medieval Women: Sex,
Gender, Feminism , ed. Nancy F. Partner (Cambridge, MA, Medieval Academy of America ,1993), reprinted in
Kathleen Biddick, The Shock of Medievalism (Durham, NC, Duke University Press 1998), p. 155.
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Slavic tradition did not unreservedly offer up the role of wife and mother as inviolable and
inescapable. Russian hagiographies are, for example, just as full of saints intervening on behalf
of battered wives (usually by offering them escape to the convent) as they are of women who
died at the hands of their husbands.4 This once again points to the idea that whatever their
sanctifying attributes, the roles of wife and mother were not essential, nor absolute.
Even the wifehood and maternity of the Mother of God was much more fraught in the
medieval East than in the West (and, frankly, much more fraught than contemporary
commentary would have one believe). While in the Latin world she most often was ascribed the
honorific Mater dei (Mother of God), in the largely Greek-speaking East, she was more
commonly Θεοτόκος (the one who bears God). These two honorifics, while denoting the same
Christological concept (ie the existence of the divine nature of Christ), provide a subtle linguistic
shift with respect to the role of Mary herself. In the West, Mary is decidedly and expressly a
“mother”; in the East, she bears God without necessarily “mothering.” Likewise, the 6th-century
Akathist to the Theotokos, still one of the most important Marian devotions of the Eastern
Orthodox Church, extolls Mary with a number of titles, including “heavenly ladder”, “source of
milk and honey,” “ark made golden by the Holy Spirit,” and even “Virgin and Bride.”
Nonetheless, this influential liturgical piece is almost entirely devoid of explicit references to
Mary in the role of “mother.”5
The position of Joseph of Nazareth in Eastern Christianity also reflects a lack of focus on
conventional family roles and norms within Marian veneration. While from early centuries, Latin
Christians spoke of “Saint Joseph” (Sanctus Josephus) who was the “sponsus” (spouse) of Mary,
he enjoyed no such position in the East. Instead, he was merely Ιωσήφ o μνηστής (Joseph the
Betrothed), a title that focuses on the fact that the marriage was never consummated, thus
preserving Mary’s virginity and excluding her from the position of earthly housewife.
The Virgin Mary is not the only holy woman whose Eastern Christian depiction defies
the roles of wife and mother. The hagiographies and histories of the Orthodox world are filled
with the stories of women with both independence and power, many of whom are viewed as
taking on masculinity through their pursuit of virtue. This includes the largely masculine exercise

4

Nancy Shields Kollmann, Russian History 25, no. 1/2, "Festschrift" For Aleksandr' Aleksandrovich Zimin (19201980)” (1998): p. 133-144.
5
Gilles Gerard Meersseman, ed. Hymnos Akathistos: Die älteste Andacht zur Gottesmutter: Griechischer Text,
deutsche Übersetzung und Einführung von GG Meersseman (Freiburg: Universitätsverlag, 1958).
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of political power. It is not outlandish to suggest that the names of Orthodox empresses echo
louder through the halls of history than those of their fathers, brothers, and husbands: Theodora,
Irene, Olga.6
In summary, while most women in the medieval Orthodox world would inevitably end up
fulfilling the roles of wife and mother, the larger social attitude towards these roles was much
less universal and there is little in the medieval tradition to suggest that these domestic roles were
seen as the purpose par excellence of women’s lives. In fact, to the contrary, it could even be
argued that the occupation of these normative family roles was instead seen as a concession, a
reduced state of holiness made inevitable by the existence of worldly demands.

The Development of the Cult of Domesticity and Early Modern Articulations of Gender
Outside of the Orthodox world, the ambiguous medieval notions of women’s proper role
began to give way in large part as a result of industrialization. As men were increasingly forced
out of traditional domestic economies into factories and other public work spaces from the early
18th century onward (spaces that were frequently dirty and dangerous), the “home” began to take
on an increased symbolic importance as a refuge from the precarities of the new economic
realities. As the home became the safe haven of the industrializing world, women (who largely
remained within the domestic economy in no small part because of the time consuming demands
of household labor) began to see that domestic role exhaled in a way which had not previously
been true. If before the role of wife and mother had been an unfortunate default position in
women’s lives and nearly always indicative of diminished opportunities for holiness, in the harsh
light of emerging industrialization, these roles, removed from the grime of the factory and the
rough-and-tumble of nascent capitalism, were to be seen as the very space in which piety,
holiness, and virtue might be cultivated. In some sense, the family home of the 18th and 19th
centuries became what the monastery had been in the Middle Ages: that place sufficiently
removed from the evils of the world whereby its occupants might be made virtuous enough that
their virtue could be spread out into the world in order to counteract its evil.

6

For more on imperial women in Byzantium see the following: Lynda Garland, Byzantine Empresses: Women and
Power in Byzantium AD 527-1204. (New York: Routledge, 2002) and Judith Herrin, Averil Cameron, and Amélie
Kuhrt, In Search of Byzantine Women: Three Avenues of Approach. (New York: Routledge, 1993).
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However, unlike medieval monasticism, which had largely been a masculine affair, the modern
home was a feminine sphere. In fact, in the wake of industrialization, the notion of “separate
spheres” became one of the most pronounced aspects of gender role construction in the West.7
Men and women, it was declared, were ordained by God and nature to occupy different spaces in
the world. Men were to have a public life; women were to remain in the private world. This
separation both resulted from and in the nature of women who were simultaneous both too weak
for the harsh public world, but also too virtuous for it. This paradoxical relationship is, in part,
what Barbara Welter termed “The Cult of Domesticity”.8
Two historical realities about the milieu in which these new, modern notions of gender,
particularly of the role of women, were evolving are significant to the current discussion: the cochronological development of the “Cult of Domesticity” with fundamentalist evangelical
Protestantism and the relatively late arrival of industrialization to traditionally Orthodox lands.
The first issue is the co-development of the idea of separate spheres with fundamentalist,
Evangelical Protestantism, especially in the English-speaking world. Evangelicalism as a distinct
religious phenomenon emerged in Britain and the United States in the 1730s and can be viewed
in large part as a response to the failure of mainline denominations (largely the Church of
England) to adequately engage with the challenges of both industrialization and the
Enlightenment. This parallel development “baked in” the ideology of separate spheres to
Evangelical Protestantism in significant ways, ways which continue to have serious
consequences as explored below. Secondly, it is important to note that while Western Europe and
North America were in the throes of emerging modernity, traditionally Orthodox lands often
remained behind. Most of the former Byzantine Empire remained under Ottoman control and
Imperial Russia confronted modernity in fits and starts, never quite able to succumb to the
influence of reform-minded tsars like Peter and Catherine.

Communist Family: Soviet Pro-Natalism and Beyond
Russia’s late arrival to industrialization and capitalism is one of history’s great ironies, of
course. When the Marx-inspired revolution came in 1917, it did not erupt in Britain, France, or
the United States where the deplorable conditions of the factory worker had inspired the German
7

For more, see, Robert B. Shoemaker, Gender in English Society 1650-1850: The Emergence of Separate Spheres?
(New York: Routledge, 2014).
8
Barbara Welter, The Cult of True Womanhood: 1820-1860. American Quarterly. 18, no. 2, Part 1 (1966): 581-606.
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philosopher’s revolutionary zeal, but instead the worker’s revolution arrived in the still-nearlyfeudal Russian Empire. Like the monarchy and the Church, the family was targeted by the new
regime for liberation. Under Lenin, divorce laws were relaxed, abortion legalized, and gender
equality mandated by the law.
However, the Revolution, the famines of the late 1920s and 1930s, the purges of the
1930s, and the Second World War were nothing short of demographic disasters for the Soviet
Union. The result was the implementation of pro-natalist policies and propaganda. These efforts,
which reached their zenith under Joseph Stalin, were occasionally revived throughout the Soviet
era. By the 1930s, abortion had been re-criminalized and divorce made more difficult. In 1923,
Aleksandra Kollontai had declared that the Soviet Union would "lift the burdens of motherhood
from women's shoulders and transfer them to the state." 9 By the 1930s, Soviet propaganda was
glorifying motherhood, which it posited was the foundation of strong families, as the most
significant way in which women could serve the state. Instead of the state taking the burden of
motherhood from women, the state would demand that she alone bore the burden in the service
of the state.
Soviet propaganda campaigns ironically mirrored much of the gender essentialism and
“separate spheres” ideology which capitalism had given birth to in the West. Motherhood
became the duty of the revolutionary woman, the highest sacrifice that she could make for the
state. Not only did the Soviet state elevate the position of mothers from the 1930s onward, the
role of wife also enjoyed new-found prestige. The obschestvennitsa, a movement of the wives of
leading workers, exalted the role of wife as a critical supporter of the male worker in the socialist
state and imbued her with much of the virtue-enhancing sanctity that can been seen in the Cult of
Domesticity.
While this positioning echoed some of the hagiographic traditions around “holy
housewives,” it was still a radical departure from the broader (and not nearly as complementary)
Orthodox understandings of motherhood that had been inherited from Byzantium and reigned
supreme in Holy Mother Russia. And when the Soviet state eventually collapsed, it would be a
fight to see which model would emerge as dominant.

9

Cited in David L. Hoffmann, "Mothers in the Motherland: Stalinist Pronatalism in its Pan-European Context."
Journal of Social History 34, no. 1 (2000): 35-54, p. 35.
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Fleeing and Exporting the Culture Wars
As the Soviet Union was vacillating between various levels of natalism throughout the
1960s, the West was experiencing a social, and sexual, revolution. The legalization of hormonal
birth control in many parts of the West unshackled women from the constant threat of pregnancy
and helped shape a growing movement for gender equality, both in and out of the bedroom.
Shifting gender and sexual norms not only affected the status of women, but also created a space
for the public participation of openly gay and lesbian people. From every side, the “separate
spheres” which had underpinned Western culture since the Industrial Revolution were starting to
come undone. Furthermore, the racial hierarchies that had been created in the wake of
colonialism were also starting to face increasing opposition. Particularly in the American
context, this battle of racial equality had proven damaging for much of the modern Evangelical
Movement which in its southern American stronghold had staked its political fortunes first on the
cause of slavery and then segregation. With the battle for legal segregation lost, the Evangelical
Movement was forced to stake out new political territory. The emerging debates over gender and
sexuality, entered into via the national legalization of abortion in the United States in 1973,
provide just the opportunity to make that shift.10
American Protestantism, both mainline and evangelical, was rocked by social upheaval of
the mid-2oth century. While Evangelicals increasingly embraced an open, even brazen political
conservatism, many mainline Protestants gradually began a process of reform. The ordination of
women, the greater inclusion of LGBT people, the relaxing of traditional teachings around
sexuality and birth control have been the trajectory of mainline Protestant denominations across
the United States for the better part of 40 years now, including the Episcopal Church USA, the
Evangelical Lutheran Church of America, and the United Methodist Church. By the late 1980s
and early 1990s, many of the conservative adherents of these progressive denominations were on
the hunt for new faith communities. Moreover, the heavily-politicized and increasingly
reactionary American Evangelical movement found some among going in search of the “ancient
Church” as a sort of ultimate, Platonic form of true conservatism, both theological and

10

The Civil Rights Movement and the re-orientation of political American Evangelical Christianity is outside the
scope of the present essay but has been the topic of significant discussion. For more see the following: Antony W.
Alumkal, "American Evangelicalism in the Post-Civil Rights Era: A Racial Formation Theory Analysis." Sociology
of Religion 65, no. 3 (2004): 195-213.
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political.11 Up until this point, Orthodox Christianity in the United States had been almost
exclusively (with the exception of early Russian missionary work in Alaska) an immigrant
church. And Orthodox churches across the country functioned as much as community centers as
religious institutions. In this context their engagement with cultural norms had been largely in
the context of assimilation, not by way of staking out a proactive position. Nonetheless, many of
these disaffected American Protestants, the vast majority without any traditionally Orthodox
background, found their way into Orthodoxy. This influx of American converts (the exact
number of American Orthodox converts is hard to pin down but estimates are around 150,000 of
the roughly 800,000 Orthodox Christians in America are converts) included on occasion the
conversion of whole parishes into the jurisdiction of an Eastern bishop. The Orthodox
jurisdictions receiving these converts varied greatly across America’s hodgepodge ecclesiastical
landscape, dictated largely by a calculus of language, culture, and numbers. The Antiochian
Archdiocese of North America and the Orthodox Church in America, two jurisdictions which
were both relatively small and had a long tradition of English-language liturgical celebration,
were the entry point of many of the new converts. By the early part of the 21st century, many of
these jurisdictions had entire parishes that were almost exclusively made up of those from
convert backgrounds as well as an average of 50% convert attendance at more traditional
“ethnic” parishes.12
This large influx of explicitly politically conservative, formerly Protestant converts into
generally smaller Orthodox jurisdictions in the United States inevitably has had an impact on the
character of these jurisdictions and American Orthodoxy more broadly. This impact might even
be disproportionately felt, due to the fact, that converts to Orthodoxy are overrepresented in selfidentified Orthodox media. Ancient Faith Radio, for example, the brainchild of two American
adult converts to Orthodoxy who spent the better part of their adult lives working in the media
wing of the Evangelical Christian juggernaut of the Moody Bible Institute, is now an official
ministry of the Antiochian Archdiocese of North and South America, and boasts many converts
among its regular commentators and guests. This is, in no small part, because many of these
11

These convert movements also sparked a cottage industry in Orthodox conversion memoirs the most famous of
which is Peter E. Gilquist, Becoming Orthodox: A Journey to the Ancient Christian Faith (Chesterton, IN: Ancient
Faith Publishing, 2000).
12
Alexei Krindatch, (2010) ʺGo and Make Disciples: Evangelization and Outreach in US Orthodox Parishes:
http://www.assemblyofbishops.org/assets/files/docs/research/EvangelizationStudyReportFinalRev4.pdf
Accessed 13/10/2019.
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converts brought with them to Orthodoxy the sleek media know-how that had defined much of
modern Evangelical Christianity, replete with its television stations, radio stations, and film
studios.
In addition to this media savviness, many of these converts, refugees from the Culture
Wars in their previous faith traditions, brought with them the baggage of those battles--battles
largely focused on gender and sexuality. They also brought with them the language of
womanhood inherited from the Industrial Revolution and the Cult of Domesticity. The blog of
popular Orthodox commentator Fredrica Matthewes-Greene, a former Episcopalian, provides a
case study in this importation. Titles among the sixty-three blogs filed under “Marriage and
Family” include “The High and Holy Calling of Being a Wife”, “The Role of Men”, and “Dating
vs Courtship”. The last piece in particular, an exhortation to move from a “dating culture” to a
“courtship” model, is borrowed heavily from contemporary currents in American Evangelical
Christianity widely-known as “purity culture.”13 Matthewes-Greene also maintains blog
categories under the headlines “Gender” and “Pro-Life”. Time and time again, she wades into the
Culture Wars, using language of separate spheres and the exalted roles of wife and mother. In
terms of gender paradigms at least, Matthewes-Greene’s blog is as American and Protestant as
they come.

The Return of Holy Mother Russia and the Emergence of the Holy Russian Mother
At the same time that the first large influx of American Protestants was converting to
Orthodox Christianity, the Soviet Union was collapsing. While it is common to acknowledge that
the collapse of communism signaled the grand re-entry of the Russian Orthodox Church into
Russian political life, it is just as important that the end of communism also opened the doors for
Protestant missionaries to enter Russia. These missionaries, largely from the United States,
brought with them a traditional animosity to Orthodoxy, inherited in no small part from the antiCatholicism of their ancestors. But they were also savvy and saw the fall of the Soviet Union as a
unique opportunity for spreading their political gospel as much as their religious one. As early as

13

For more on purity culture and the American Evangelical Movement see Courtney Ann Irby, "Dating in Light of
Christ: Young Evangelicals Negotiating Gender in the Context of Religious and Secular American Culture."
Sociology of Religion 75, no. 2 (2014): 260-283.
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1992, American Evangelicals had been invited by Russian government officials to provide
“moral education” in Russia’s state schools, via the training of teachers.14
In many ways Russia was the perfect ground for American Evangelicals next battle in a
war that they increasingly saw in global terms. Russian society was still deeply conservative but
had been stripped of some of its Orthodox memory and past by seventy years of communism.
That being said, while it was easy for American Evangelicals to insert their values into the
Russian context, their identity was another matter. Being Orthodox had been synonymous with
being Russian for centuries before communism and even in the wake of the communist calamity,
most Russians still identified themselves as Orthodox, regardless of their religious beliefs.
Victory would not come through beating them, but joining them. And in the early 2000s, Russia
provided two perfect allies to join. The election of Vladimir Putin as the President of the Russian
Federation in 2000 and the elevation of Patriarch Kirill to the apostolic throne of Moscow in
2009 provided the indigenous conduits by which the America Evangelical weaponization of
Russian Christianity for the Culture Wars might be completed.
Born Vladimir Mikhailovich Gundyayev in Leningrad in 1946, Patriarch Kirill has,
among things, hosted a religious-themed television program since 1994. He has also waded into
the Culture Wars on an international stage in a way that no high ranking Orthodox cleric has
before him. He has been a strong opponent of LGBT rights and has pushed what is essentially a
Russianized version of separate spheres ideology, particularly with its emphasis on women as
guardians of moral virtue. For example, the Russian Church has offered its tacit support to the
decriminalization of domestic violence in Russia and offered a 2015 explanation for domestic
violence that said, in part, “We think that the term ‘domestic violence’ is connected to ideas of
radical feminism where a man is often portrayed as a potential aggressor...”15 In 2011, the
Patriarch’s close associate sparked controversy when he suggested that women provoke rape by
“indecent apparel” and drunkenness.”16 Patriarch Kirill has also helped to organize forums on the

14

For more on this fascinating story see Perry Lynn Glanzer, The Quest for Russia's Soul: Evangelicals and Moral
Education in Post-Communist Russia (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2002).
15
“Пояснения в отношении оценки Патриаршей Комиссией по вопросам семьи, защиты материнства и
детства термина ‘насилие в семье’, иных аналогичных терминов и связанных с ними концепций и
подходов.” Русская Православная Церковь. http://pk-semya.ru/dokumenty-komissii/item/2136-poyasneniyanasilie.html Accessed 13/10/2019.
16
Ellen Barry, “A Dress Code For Russians? Priest Chides Skimpiness.” The New York Times. 18 Jan 2011.
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/19/world/europe/19russia.html. Accessed 11/10/2019.
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“sanctity of motherhood” where delegates hold discussions “on the Centuries-Old Family
Traditions as the Foundation of Russia’s Future.”17
These statements would be damaging enough if isolated to the Patriarch’s canonical
sphere of influence; however, Russia and her religious leaders have been rewarded for the extent
to which they have adopted and promoted mainstream traditionalist attitudes toward gender, both
at home and abroad. Many conservative Christians in the West have come to view Russia as the
last outpost of true Christendom. This view has, in turn, allowed Vladimir Putin to wield the
influence of the Orthodox Church as a weapon of Russian soft-power, thus expanding the
Patriarch’s influence abroad. The gender ideals imported into Russia after the fall of communism
are now being exported abroad as quintessentially Russian, and thus Orthodox, values.

The Orthodox Woman Today
The twin forces of American Evangelicalism and Russian Orthodoxy’s revised
conservatism have come to dominate the construction of modern Orthodox women. The
contemporary Orthodox woman in her normative form is a wife and mother par excellence. She
is dutiful, domestic, and the progenitor of many children. She forswears contraception. She veils
her hair in church and perhaps outside of it. She is, as Patriarch Kirill and his ally suggested
above, the guardian of men’s morality, preventing men from falling into sin as a result of her
lack of virtue. Perhaps most importantly of all, she stays confined to her proper role and does not
seek the ecclesiastical power that her mainline Protestant counterparts have achieved. She is
victor in the Culture Wars by force of example alone. These characteristics are, importantly, in
this imagined form, decidedly not a response to modernity. In fact, through an idealized
interpretation of the past, the six hundred years of modernity are swept away and the values
which modernity, both capitalism and communism, created with respect to gender are transposed
onto the “holy Orthodox Empires” of yore. Gone are the complex and multifaceted views of
women from the past: Some mothers and wives yes, but also martyrs, monastics, and empresses.
In this usable past, all are virtuous mother and wives.

“4th Forum on ‘The Sanctity of Motherhood’ opens in Kazan.” The Russian Orthodox Church: Department of
External Church Relations. 27.11.2015. https://mospat.ru/en/2015/11/27/news125573/. Accessed 10/10/2019.
17
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All-American (Orthodox) Girl
In the American context (as elsewhere), this contemporary construction of Orthodox
womanhood has been rift with conflict across the lines of traditionally Orthodox ethnic groups
and between convert and “cradle” communities. While much of this conflict is subtle,
manifestations of this conflict can be seen in a few explicit symbols and debates: the veiling of
women, issues related to reproductive freedom, and the ordination of women to the diaconate
(and even priesthood). These three areas of contention also demonstrate the ways in which the
new Orthodox womanhood is coming to bear on communities in the United States and into the
lives of real Orthodox women.
“On Account of the Angels” (in America): The Case of the Headscarf in American
Orthodoxy
The veiling of women (particularly during worship) was a fairly pancultural expression of
feminine identity just a century ago. Not only Christian women across confessional borders, but
also Muslim, Jewish, Hindu, and Sikh women were mandated to cover their hair as an act of
modesty and arguably submission both during worship and in the conduct of their daily lives.
The veil remained, for example, a mandatory part of Catholic Mass attendance until the Second
Vatican Council.
In the United States, most Protestant women abandoned the veil for the more stylish and
seemingly modern cover of hats early in the 19th century. This singled out the headscarf proper
as the domain of certain, usually suspect, immigrant groups. Although these groups were initially
Catholics, by the early 20th century Jewish and Orthodox Christian migrants had begun to enter
the United States in large numbers. Early 2oth-century Orthodox Christian migrants to the
United States were predominantly of Greek and Syrian extraction. The women from these
communities came from cultures in which the headscarf was not only still being worn as part of
worship but in daily life. While many women in these communities might continue to cover their
hair in public for a few years after immigration, or even their whole lives, their daughters were
by and large discouraged from taking up the practice. In these communities, the “unveiling” of
the community’s women was seen, particularly by the women within these communities, as a
significant step toward assimilation.18
18

See: “Women” in the Frank Kamberos Oral History Collection. National Hellenic Museum. Chicago, IL.
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As might be expected, the removal of headcovering during worship came slower than in
daily life. However, by the early 1940s, most Greek women in the United States, particularly
those who had been born in the country, had discarded the headscarf for hats during liturgical
attendance.19 Syrian women followed a similar pattern. When, in the 1960s, other American
women began to attend worship services with bare heads, women in these communities followed
suit.
This pattern was in sharp contrast to America’s growing Russian immigrant community.
Beginning with the Russian Revolution in 1917 and continuing throughout the 20th century,
Russian immigrants arrived in the United States, largely fleeing the Soviet regime. Unlike their
Greek and Syrian counterparts, who were arguably running toward something (i.e. “The
American Dream”), these Russian immigrants were running away from Soviet communism.
While the Greeks and Syrians came to America seeking a new life, these Russian immigrants
came because their old way of life was fundamentally threatened. This led to a greater
conservatism within Russian immigrant communities and in Russian liturgical practice in the
United States. Consequently, the headcovering remained and continues to remain a widely
practiced part of women’s worship in the Russian heritage churches within the United States.
This pattern, not insignificantly, has repeated itself across traditionally Orthodox immigrant
communities. Communities that arrived largely as economic migrants (Greeks, Syrians,
Ethiopians) assimilated many of their liturgical practices and quickly discarded mandatory--or
even widespread--headcovering. Communities that arrived largely as refugees, particularly from
the anti-religious communist regimes, (Russians, Romanians, Serbs) maintained non-assimilated
liturgical practices, including requiring the mandatory veiling of women.
This division was not of much consequence, however, given the siloed nature of
American Orthodoxy, until the wave of conversions into Orthodoxy beginning in the late 1980s
referenced above. Several features affected how these new converts were enculturated into
Orthodox practice. First, it is not without importance that many converts came and continue to
come into the Orthodox Church via the direction of monastic clergy. Within monastic
communities, liturgical practices, particularly around gender, have always been deeply
conservative. The veiling of women in monasteries in the United States, as throughout the rest of
19

Ibid. Also note, the adoption of hats by Greek Orthodox women followed a similar pattern of assimilation seen in
Greek Orthodox liturgical practices in the United States which included the addition of pews into church building,
the adoption of mixed-sex choirs, and the introduction of organ music.
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the Orthodox world, is de rigueur. Moreover, these converts largely came into Orthodoxy
explicitly seeking a conservative, “authentic” Christianity that would be an expression of their
distinctness from the larger, changing culture. Unlike the immigrant communities that formed the
core of Orthodox America, most of which were deeply committed to assimilation into American
life, American converts to Orthodoxy were instead equally committed to making themselves
distinct from the larger American culture. Finally, many of the initial converts to the Orthodox
church came in via Russian tradition jurisdictions where the headcovering was still common.
Those who entered into the Syrian Antiochian Archdiocese (where assimilation had largely
blotted out the practice) entered, at least early on, as whole parishes. In these cases, the
headcovering was frequently adopted (or returned) as an act of defiance against the former
tradition. Notably, when this happened, it was not the stylish, Western “Sunday hat,” the most
likely liturgical accessory abandoned by the grandmothers of these recent converts, but instead
the much older, seemingly more “Orthodox” headscarf that reappeared. Perhaps even more
oddly, some of these women, particularly the most politically conservative of them, began to
practice head covering as a constant part of daily life, something that has been abandoned by
most women from traditionally Orthodox backgrounds, particularly in the United States, for well
over a century.
The internet has been a gathering place for women dedicated to this practice and has
created a space in which the practice is encouraged as part of a larger “return to femininity.”
Take, for example, this anonymous blog published on the well-trafficked Orthodox Christian
Information Center by a woman calling herself “Elisabeth,” which declares the following:
In 1995 I was chrismated Orthodox and was surprised to find myself again the only
woman wearing a head-covering in my parish. An Orthodox sister told me, with a nod to
my scarf, “We don’t have to wear that anymore.” I smiled and said, “I know, but I want
to.” St. Paul had said “ought,” not “must.” It was my voluntary obedience, even if I didn’t
understand the “why’s.” By now I had no intention of giving up the benefits. I felt
blessed and protected, feminine, and, paradoxically, confident and free—in the presence
of guardian and ministering angels.20
Here the veiling of a convert woman becomes not only an assertion of her new Orthodox
Christian identity, but also a not so subtle cue to her “cradle” fellow worshipers that not only has

“Elisabeth”. “On Account of the Angels: Why I Cover My Hair” Orthodox Christian Information Center. Nd.
http://orthodoxinfo.com/praxis/headcoverings.aspx. Accessed 30/09/2019.
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she found a more Orthodox expression of worship, but also a more feminine form of worship.
And that in that “reclaimed” femininity there is an opportunity for greater spirituality.
This, significantly, is not just a position taken up by the most conservative voices in the
American Orthodox world. A post by Giacomo Sanfilippo on his blog Orthodoxy in Dialogue
takes a similar tack. Sanfilippo and Orthodoxy in Dialogue are seen by many, particularly the
most conservative converts to Orthodoxy, as the outer fringe of progressive Orthodoxy. Yet here
he deploys the rhetoric of virtue-inspiring femininity vis-a-vi the veil that is clearly a product of
negative Western reactions to shifting gender norms. While coming to great lengths to state that
he would never require women to put on the veil, he does write the following:
I loved the more traditional—dare I say more spiritual—ambiance created by the near
universal use of the headscarf by the women and girls at Holy Trinity. I never sensed on
their part any feelings of being “oppressed” or “unmodern,” any obsequiousness or lack
of self-confidence in their dealings with their husbands and the other men of the parish;
nor did I detect any sign of arrogance or condescension toward the women on the part of
the men.21
Beyond the absurd notion that a man, especially a man who is an outsider in what is by his own
account a highly traditional and insular community, would have any access to the nature of the
relationships between men and women in that context or to whether or not these women felt
oppressed, is the notion that the covering of women lends greater spirituality. This is encourages
the implication that a veiled Orthodox women is more authentically Orthodox in a meaningful
way than women who, largely as a product of a dynamic history, have taken off the veil.
Across ideological lines, and as seen in both the case of those from traditionally
Orthodox backgrounds in which the head covering was maintained and in the case of converts
who adopted the headcovering, the veiling of women has become a visible symbol of an
Orthodox womanhood in which women became the standard-bear and visible representative of
Orthodox defiance against the liberalization of the wider culture and a carefully constructed
“Orthodox” femininity becomes the most visible symbol of Orthodox difference to the wider
world. In this way, the re-veiling of American Orthodox women is strikingly similar to what has
occurred among Muslim women throughout the world. While by the middle of the 20th century,

Giacomo Sanfilippo. “Headscarves: Some Thoughts on Orthodoxy and Culture. Orthodoxy in Dialogue. 6 July
2018
https://orthodoxyindialogue.com/2018/07/06/headscarves-some-thoughts-on-orthodoxy-and-culture-bygiacomo-sanfilippo/. Accessed 09/10/2019.
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most modern Muslim women had taken off the hijab, in the wake of Arab nationalism, growing
Islamic fundamentalism, and the Iranian Revolution, the headscarf was reintroduced and readopted by Muslim women, quickly becoming the symbol par excellence of Muslim identity in
the larger world.22 This similarity points to the way in which the Cult of Domesticity and its
focus on “contagious” female virtue had influenced contemporary, fundamentalist conceptions of
womanhood across religious boundaries.

Mandated Motherhood: The Shifting Terrain of Abortion and Birth Control
Another debate, one with much deeper ethical and theological considerations, in which
the reshaping of Orthodox womanhood has become particularly relevant is in the conversation
around reproductive freedom within the Orthodox Church. “Abortion and gay marriage” are the
omnipresent stakes of the American Culture War. These two issues, tangentially related by the
ways in which they question traditional gender roles, but otherwise widely dissimilar, have
become the two most important markers of identity within American political life and there is the
widespread assumption that one’s opinion on one issue inevitably leads to a paired opinion on
the other. It was via the national legalization abortion in 1973 that Evangelical Christians
transitioned from a political posture primarily concerned about maintaining segregation to one
primarily concerned about maintaining traditional gender boundaries and norms. So it should
come as no surprise that when Evangelical Protestants came to convert to Orthodoxy in large(r)
numbers, they brought with them this cultural battle. We will leave here the issue of more
complicated and fraught issue of abortion and instead focus on how anti-abortion rhetoric and
pro-natalist rhetoric in the dialectic of the New Orthodox Womanhood has resulted in a renewed
focus on the use of birth control by Orthodox women. It can be argued that the position of the
Orthodox Church on the use of artificial birth control is ambiguous at best. The early Church
Fathers could simply not have conceived of non-abortifacient birth control as it now exists and
so are silent. And while there were a handful of early 20th-century Orthodox condemnations of
hormonal birth control, for example by the Ecumenical Patriarchate in 1937, Orthodox churches
across jurisdictional lines largely stayed out of the debate on birth control as it raged in many
mainline Protestant jurisdictions. In fact, it can be argued that the Orthodox position toward
22
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artificial birth control began to moderate throughout the middle of the 20th century, as the
practice, at least with respect to married couples was increasingly seen as a private, pastoral
matter.
One example of this moderation, particularly significant to American Orthodox circles,
can be seen in the revisions made to Metropolitan Kallistos Ware’s The Orthodox Way. A
modern classic in Orthodox Christian English-language literature, the book (along with his also
seminal The Orthodox Church) has been standard reading for English-speaking Orthodox
Christians, both cradle and convert, for over half a century. Moreover, Metropolitan Kallistos’s
books have largely been understood as a touchpoint for normative practices within Orthodoxy.
Regarding birth control, the 1963 edition of The Orthodox Way reads simply, “Artificial methods
of contraception are forbidden in the Orthodox Church.”23 However, by the 1984 edition this
explanation had been expanding to read the following:
The use of contraceptives and other devices for birth control is on the whole strongly
discouraged in the Orthodox Church. Some bishops and theologians altogether condemn
the employment of such methods. Others, however, have recently begun to adopt a less
strict position, and urge that the question is best left to the discretion of each individual
couple, in consultation with the spiritual father.24
Yet even this couched explanation was replaced just ten years later in the 1993 edition which
reads in this nuanced and (frankly) non-committal way:
Concerning contraceptives and other forms of birth control, differing opinions exist
within the Orthodox Church. In the past birth control was in general strongly condemned,
but today a less strict view is coming to prevail, not only in the west but in traditional
Orthodox countries. Many Orthodox theologians and spiritual fathers consider that the
responsible use of contraception within marriage is not in itself sinful. In their view, the
question of how many children a couple should have, and at what intervals, is best
decided by the partners themselves, according to the guidance of their own consciences.25
These revisions to The Orthodox Way chart the growing nuance and discretion taken to the issue
of hormonal birth control in the Orthodox Church in the English-speaking, particularly the
United States, throughout much of the 20th century. However, with the infusion of culture
warrior American converts into the mainstream of Orthodox life, the clock began to turn back on
the American Orthodox attitude toward birth control. Ancient Faith Radio, for example, has

23
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frequently hosted blogs and podcast in which contraception is unequivocally condemned.26
Notably, the rhetoric surrounding the condemnation of birth control shifted away from the notion
that sexual contact, even within the context of marriage, should be limited (the root of the
traditional Orthodox position on contraception), a pro-natalist glorification of motherhood and an
emphasis on motherhood and mothering as the height of female identity and the ends of feminine
activity, including all sexual activity.
While there has been a definite shift in the rhetoric around contraception in the Orthodox
Church, particularly in the ever influential “non-official” channels, the waters are ever more
murky in terms of practice. While studies have indicated that American Catholic women, who
belong to a tradition with a much more pronounced opposition to contraception, practice it at
incredibly high rates, no similar studies have been conducted among American Orthodox
Christian women; however, an antidotal look at birth rates among women from traditionally
Orthodox backgrounds over the course of the 20th and 21st centuries suggests that contraception
is widely used. This has happened both as a matter of assimilation and as a result of an
increasing educational and professional success among women from these immigrant
backgrounds. It is worth noting that the large family sizes and the lack of educational opportunity
afforded to women were among the chief slurs uttered against Southern and Eastern European
immigrants (who were frequently Orthodox) upon their arrival in the early 20th century. The use
of contraception to achieve both of these goals was both a matter of personal fulfilment and
social survival for these first immigrant women and their daughters.
Much like in the case of the headscarves, when American converts arrived to Orthodoxy,
they were not interested in assimilation as the immigrant women had been but in signaling their
difference. In this climate, the creation and rearing of large families, particularly among
Orthodox converts, has become yet another marker of both Orthodox and a more broadly
conservative identity. More sinisterly, the use of contraception has become a gatekeeping
mechanism used to punish or exclude, particularly from the Eucharist, women seen as too
“progressive”, as “feminist,” or as not otherwise conforming to understood norms of the

See, for example, “Birth Control and the Orthodox Christian.” Ancient Faith Ministries. 26 July 2012.
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Accessed
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contemporary version of Orthodox womanhood in which mothering is seen as a goal, an end in
itself, and a way to virtue.
A Priesthood of All Believers: The Rhetoric of Women’s Ordination and Women in
Theology
For well over a millennium Orthodox women could be ordained to the diaconate. This is not a
question, but a historical reality. The practice largely died out in late Byzantium, though it has at
certain times and places been revived. Orthodox women have never been ordained to the
sacerdotal priesthood. This is also a historical fact. Finally, it is not in question that the
ordination of women was one of the modernizing trends which has caused a great deal of strife
within mainline Protestant denominations in recent history and that many of those American
converts to Orthodoxy fled their tradition upon the ordination of women to the clergy. Many of
these converts have reshaped the conversation around women’s ordination in a way that is not
dissimilar from the debate around contraception. In both instances, what was once a realm of
gradual transformation within American Orthodox communities has been swept up in the debates
of the Culture War and been infused with modern Western notions around gender and
femininity. In the case of contraception, this was the sanctification of motherhood. In the case of
ordination, it is the notion of “separate spheres”.
There was in the middle of the 20th century a fairly robust debate around the ordination
of women in the Orthodox Church. The issue of women’s ordination was (and is) importantly, in
the Orthodox context at least, intimately tied to the issue of theological education. And it must be
understood that historically denying women access to some form of ordination has also meant
denying them access to a theological education. So, in the middle of the 20th century, if nothing
else, many conceded that renewing the female diaconate was an advisable step. Moreover, there
was increasingly opportunity for women to obtain a theological education, in no small part due to
the understanding that women might at some point take on more official positions within the
Church. St. Vladimir’s Orthodox Seminary, the flagship educational institution of the Orthodox
Church in America, founded by the acclaimed Father Alexander Schmemann, admitted female
students from the 1960s. The Greek Orthodox Archdiocese’s seminary, Holy Cross, admitted its
first female student in the 1980s. As early as the late 1970s, there were serious theological
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dialogues occurring around the issue of women’s ordination to the diaconate and to the
priesthood.
But none of this early promise has manifested as change and arguably the conversation
about official roles for women within the American Orthodox Church is going backward. Today
there are ten Orthodox theological schools in America, but there are fewer than five women with
terminal degrees combined teaching theology at these institutions. Most Orthodox women
theologians teach outside of Orthodox institutions and, furthermore, obtain their theological
educations outside of explicitly Orthodox contexts. Moreover, the conversation on the ordination
of women, even in the historically attested to institution of the diaconate, has largely become
bogged down in Culture War rhetoric. This can be seen, bizarrely enough, in the American
reaction to the ordination of women to the diaconate in the Congo by the Patriarchate of
Alexandria. Take, for example, this blog posted by Father Lawrence Farley to Ancient Faith
Ministries blog on January 26, 2018 entitled “Looking Down the Road to LMNOP”:
It panders to the feminist vision of “empowering women” by erasing gender
distinctions, and reconfiguring Church praxis so that it conforms to secular norms. But
the real problem with the whole project lies elsewhere, for the engine driving it is
modern feminism, not ancient Tradition, and thus it involves ignoring and eroding
parts of that Tradition. The final result will not simply be more women serving
liturgically and in ordained ministry, but further betrayals of Tradition and embraces of
secular modernity. We don’t have to guess where it leads; the Anglican church and
others like it have kindly given us abundant demonstration of it in our own generation.
This was foreseen by the late Fr. Thomas Hopko, of blessed memory. When
interviewed by AGAIN Magazine some decades ago about this very question, he said,
“Many years ago when women’s ordination was first being discussed in the Faith and
Order Commission in the World Council of Churches a Russian Orthodox priest,
Father Vitaly Borovoy, said, ‘The Russians have a saying. If you say A you have to
say B; if you say B then you have to say C. I’m interested in where you get when
you’re at LMNOP.’ His [Fr. Vitaly’s] point was, of course, if you take a step in a
particular direction, you must see the full implication of where you are going.”
When Hopko first made these statements, the denominations which embraced the
ordination of women had yet not embraced same-sex marriage or begun to eliminate or
limit masculine references to God. If the ordination of women were the “A” to which
Frs. Vitaly and Thomas referred, these later moves would be a “D” or a “E”, since they
came only a few decades after the normalization of the ordination of women. But they
came surely nonetheless, despite the assurances given as part of the required “adequate
preparation and education” that no further changes or erosion would be forthcoming.
And the ordination of women began with the restoration of deaconesses. In
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Anglicanism, deaconesses (once sharply distinguished from deacons) were declared by
the preparers and educators to be actual deacons, whether the new female deacons
liked it or not (some did not). But, they said, it would never lead to female priests.
Until, of course, it did, but this would never lead to female bishops. Until, of course, it
did.
Then, since gender did not matter, it was discovered as modern society continued in its
erosion of Christian tradition, that—well, gender didn’t matter, so a priest could be
homosexual or lesbian. Episcopal priest Gene Robinson, for example, after being
married with children, “came out” in 1986, (ten years after his church voted to ordain
women), met his gay partner Andrew the next year, moved in with him the year after
that (having their house blessed by their bishop), and was elected bishop in 2003. They
were legally married in church in June 2003 (Robinson said that “I always wanted to
be a June bride”). They divorced in 2014.
Those asserting that such a progression from women’s ordination to same-sex
marriage could not happen in Orthodoxy are guilty of magical thinking, and need to
produce evidence that American Orthodox are somehow immune to such sweeping
cultural shifts as have effected (sic) everyone else. Ad hominem attacks on former
Anglican convert clergy sounding the alarm and suggesting that they suffer from a
kind Episcopalian Post-traumatic Stress Syndrome do not constitute evidence, and
are scarcely worthy of a reply.27
This blog is reproduced in such large part above because of the extent to which it
exemplifies how this argument has been reframed from its original context in the early part of
the 20th century, when, in American Orthodox communities, it was occurring almost
exclusively among the descendants of immigrants in what was still a church body collectively
characterized by its immigrant identity. Today, for people like Father Lawrence and others
(primarily those who have been shaped by Culture War conflict within their tradition of
origin), the ordination of women (and by extension the inclusion of women in the formal
theological life of the Church) has become a proxy for everything related to shifting gender
norms in society, a step on to the “slippery slope” toward “same-sex marriage...and (limiting)
masculine references to God.”28 A rigid conception of gender roles, divided into that very
modern, very Western notion of separate spheres must be maintained, in this view, in order to
prevent a complete coming apart of gender altogether. Moreover, perhaps even more foreign
to a tradition in which some sort of gender ambiguity was in fact praised, is the idea that
Emphasis is mine. Lawrence Farley, “Looking Down the Road to LMNOP.” Ancient Faith Ministries. 26 January
2018. https://blogs.ancientfaith.com/nootherfoundation/deaconesses-looking-road-lmnop/. Accessed 09/10/2019.
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maintaining gender norms in some sort of sacred obligation a hill on which the defense of
Holy Tradition must die. Just as in the case of headscarves and contraception, it is women
who bear the brunt of this defense. It is women who are excluded not only from ordained
ministry, but frequently from an explicitly Orthodox theological education as well. The New
Orthodox Woman is to be wife and mother, but never deaconess or priest or, perhaps even,
theologian. To be any of these would mean to threaten the very foundation of the Christian
anthropology that has been constructed in the light of modernity.
Conclusion
This new version of Orthodox womanhood has consequences. The idealized modern
Orthodox woman is just that: modern. And just perhaps, for an ancient faith, therein lies the
problem. The co-option of contemporary Orthodox womanhood is part of a larger struggle within
the Orthodox world. It is a struggle to maintain what makes Orthodoxy unique in the face of an
increasingly global movement deeply invested in the cultural battles of the day. Reimagining,
redefining, and reclaiming Orthodox womanhood in all its complexity and uncertainty is
essential for maintaining Orthodox identity in the 21st century.
Contemporary debates in the American Orthodox Church which focus on women,
debates that include the wearing of the veil, contraception and women’s place in the ordained
ministry, all draw heavily on notions of gender and particularly of female gender expression
which evolved in the Industrial Revolution and its aftermath. It is a world very foreign to that in
which Orthodox norms and Orthodox anthropology first evolved and it is a very transitory
context. Samuel Callen, the famed Presbyterian minister, warned that “The Church that weds
itself to an age will be a widow in the next.” This warning is frequently issued against those
seeking reform in their faith traditions, but in the Orthodox context of gender it might well be a
warning of a different kind. The traditions and history of the Orthodox Church provide rich
ground to explore how to be a woman in the world. When the tradition is surrendered to the
narrow demands of a very recent, and to Orthodoxy largely foreign cultural conflict, we risk
losing this rich tradition. This tradition can provide true sustenance to women, and men, and
must be preserved, no matter the forces that would seek to rip it away.
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